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Introduction 
 
 Jeremy Waldron, in Law and Disagreement, argues that judicial review by institutions 
such as the United States Supreme Court, where largely unaccountable judges have final say on 
important political issues, is incompatible with democracy. An essential premise to his argument 
is majoritarianism, which is the view that the citizen majority’s view on any given political 
matter should be decisive in a democratic system. In this article, I will evaluate Waldron’s 
arguments against judicial review in light of criticisms of his majoritarianism by Ronald 
Dworkin and others. I will argue that modified versions of Waldron’s positions on both 
majoritarianism and judicial review can be successfully defended against those criticisms. The 
essay will proceed as follows. 
First, I discuss what Waldron characterizes as the circumstances of politics, including 
reasonable disagreement and a felt need for common action with regard to important political 
issues. This problematic situation can be separated from Waldron’s substantive conclusions in a 
manner that provides a common framework for thinking about the decisional problem brought 
about in politics. 
Second, the circumstances of politics will be shown to require political institutions that 
are justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In this way, any legitimate political institution must be, 
in some sense, beyond reasonable disagreement.  
Third, I will examine two prominent solutions to this problem: (1) Waldron’s procedural 
solution arguing that only fair procedures can be free of reasonable disagreement and (2) 
Dworkin’s substantive solution arguing that at least some considerations of substantive fairness 
are beyond reasonable disagreement.  
Fourth, Dworkin’s robust substantive solution will be shown to lack any independent 
criteria by which to judge better or worse outcomes, and for that reason is not justifiable to all 
reasonable citizens. Rejecting robust substantive solutions, I will argue that Waldron’s 
majoritarianism as a procedural solution can be defended against Dworkin’s objections that 
substantive political inequalities are present in a majoritarian system. 
Fifth, I will consider the objection that Waldron’s majoritarianism is subject to 
reasonable disagreement (1) in particular contexts and so is itself controversial as a principle, and 
(2) in the inclusion of undefended substance in majoritarianism. In response to the former, it will 
be argued that though the use of a majority decision-procedure in specific contexts is 
controversial, it is uncontroversial as a general principle in second-order contexts. In response to 
the latter, it will first be conceded that majoritarianism is indeed thinly substantive. The original 
distinction of procedure vs. substance will be shown as only helpful in relation to robust 
substantive views, such as Dworkin’s solution. On the basis of a very thin substance that draws 
on Waldron’s pre-existing defense, I will show that majoritarianism is an uncontroversial general 
principle, and so maintains its status as a legitimate decision-procedure. This thin substance will 
primarily be conditional upon the belief that all are entitled to basic rights, and that when 
combined with the permanent circumstances of politics, this assumption necessitates a 
fundamental right to participate, and thus orients all citizens as the proper source from which to 
derive opinions regarding important political decisions. 
Finally, after having defended a modified majoritarianism as a legitimate political 
institution, I will analyze the compatibility of judicial review with that modified majoritarianism. 
I will first present what is ordinarily thought to be at stake in the debate over the legitimacy of 
judicial review. Then, I will demonstrate that American-style judicial review is a prototypical 
   Verdin 2	  
instance of the judicial review that concerns theorists like Waldron. Third, I will argue that 
judicial review is incompatible with majoritarianism only in the instances where the majority is 
unable – by whatever means the majority deems appropriate – to reverse or alter the decisions of 
the Justices. Finally, I will show that the inclusion of thin substance into a modified version of 
Waldron’s majoritarianism qualifies the case against judicial review only insofar as it is 
controversial that all citizens are entitled to basic rights.1 
 
I. A Common Framework: Circumstances of Politics 
 
 In the arena of politics, there is nothing more certain than the presence of widespread 
disagreement on matters that are nevertheless of such importance as to require immediate or 
near-immediate coordinated action. Jeremy Waldron, in Law and Disagreement, refers to this 
problematic situation as the circumstances of politics.  
 
A. Reasonable Disagreement 
 
 The first fundamental circumstance of politics is disagreement about important and 
substantial political issues. As John Rawls notes, this disagreement is “not a mere historical 
condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture of 
democracy.”2 Some of this disagreement can be ignored as unreasonable, as in the case of 
arguments put forth by “[ignorant] scoundrels (who care nothing for rights) or moral illiterates 
(who misunderstand their force and importance).”3 However, the most prominent of political 
disagreements should be understood as reasonable. Here Waldron draws upon Rawls’s 
discussion of the burdens of judgment. In short, given the vast and diverse experiences that have 
shaped individuals’ moral and political views, in addition to the complexity involved in trying to 
critically evaluate or justify those views, it is reasonable that some individuals reach different 
conclusions.4  
 Note that the existence of multiple reasonable views does not entail some form of moral 
relativism, but since “such disagreements are, for practical political purposes, irresolvable,” 
views may be reasonable without also being true in a morally objective sense.5 Hence, in the 
case of opposing groups of individuals who differ strongly in their views about rights, even if 
one group is in fact correct in their view, both groups may be perfectly reasonable in the sense of 
the term used here.6  
 It is also important to note what is not being committed to here. First, it is an open 
question how much disagreement there is about any particular political issue or set of political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note that the assumption that all citizens are entitled to basic rights is not as robustly substantive as it 
appears at first glance. As my paper will show, this commitment recognizes that citizens have varying 
views as to what counts as a basic or fundamental right. Instead, the assumption is only committed to the 
uncontroversial view that all citizens are entitled to some basic rights, whatever those rights may be. This 
view will become clearer as the paper progresses. 
2 John Rawls, “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus,” 246. 
3 Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1346. 
4 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 56-57. 
5 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1368. 
6 This is an important distinction from the ordinary usage of the term ‘reasonable,’ which often relates to 
the truth of the matter. 
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issues – e.g. political rights. Second, there is room to debate how much of political disagreement 
is indeed reasonable. Depending upon one’s conclusions with regard to these moving parts, 
different political systems might be envisaged. In any case, it suffices that we agree that there is 
reasonable disagreement, and that it is especially rampant in politics. 
 
B. A Felt Need for Common Action 
 
 The second fundamental circumstance of politics is a felt need for a common course of 
action where the alternative is no action at all – i.e. the status quo.7 Even if everyone were to 
disagree about what the best or correct coordinated action should be with regard to some 
important issue, they all prefer that something reasonable should be done rather than nothing. 
This circumstance is intended to apply to all political issues that are regarded as important but 
have not yet been resolved. 
 In an uncontroversial instance of this circumstance, Waldron draws attention to the laws 
of rape. Beyond the general view of rape as morally wrong there are “aspects of the law of rape 
which are complex and controversial: for example, statutory rape, marital rape, homosexual rape, 
the bases (if any) on which consent is to be inferred, mistakes as to consent, etc.”8 No matter 
what individuals may think of these controversial issues, “[e]ach [will likely] prefer that these 
matters be settled even in a way that he opposes, if the alternative is no rape law at all.”9 
 
C. Interdependence of the Fundamental Circumstances of Politics 
 
 The two fundamental circumstances of politics should not be understood as independent, 
but interdependent. Neither condition would pose as significant a problem in the absence of the 
other condition. “Disagreement would not matter if there did not need to be a concerted course of 
action; and the need for a common course of action would not give rise to politics as we know it 
if there was not at least the potential for disagreement about what the concerted course of action 
should be.”10 
 
II. A Legitimate Solution: Beyond Reasonable Disagreement 
 
Having established a common framework in the circumstances of politics, the next 
concern is how to meet the challenges posed by this problematic situation – i.e. how decisions 
are to be made where there is reasonable disagreement on important political issues and there is 
a felt need for a common course of action with regard to those sets of issues. The most basic 
criterion that must be satisfied in an institution is decisiveness in relation to whatever is in 
disagreement. However, many decision-procedures satisfy this requirement, from tossing a coin 
to authoritarian regimes. 
What is needed is a decision-mechanism that legitimizes authority over the citizens that 
compose the community, and most importantly over the citizens that reasonably disagree with 
the final decision on the merits – recall that if all reasonable individuals already share the view 
that the community decides upon (so there is no reasonable disagreement), it is much easier to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 102. 
8 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 105. 
9 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 105. 
10 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 102-103. 
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convince them to act upon it. It is much like the scenario where two friends that support 
fundamentally opposed ideas agree to a coin-toss to resolve the disagreement. Though one of the 
friends is fated to disagree in one sense, his agreement to the coin-toss obliges him to accept the 
outcome. A political decision procedure is thus legitimate – as Waldron suggests – when it is 
“explicable and justifiable to all…[reasonable citizens] who have to live under [it].”11 In short, 
we need an institution that is beyond reasonable disagreement, or at least whose legitimacy is 
beyond reasonable disagreement. 
The most important criteria to be satisfied by any institution are principles of fairness, 
including qualities of respect and equality. Sufficient satisfaction of these principles will be 
required for any institution to be justified to all reasonable people, i.e., it is a condition on their 
submission to outcomes that they may not agree with.12 Satisfaction of these principles will tend 
to make controversial any view that significantly restricts the number of views that are 
considered reasonable, and so requires that most views be considered as reasonable.13 
Pragmatics might also dictate the inclusion of most views as reasonable, but this is a secondary 
concern. To do otherwise would predictably violate qualities of respect and equality that I will 
assume derive from some view of objective human dignity or value that is possessed by all 
individuals, and to be found in any acceptable theory of a legitimate institution. It is 
unfathomable that reasonable citizens would be willing to accept an institution that does not treat 
them as equals and respect them at the most basic level of human dignity. It is then beyond 
reasonable disagreement that the best institution will maximize the principles of fairness – to the 
degree possible. 
At this point, however, there is debate as to how much we can suppose citizens to truly 
find agreement upon. Some argue that citizens are in agreement on certain fundamental values of 
political equality, while others argue that this is not the case.  
 
III. Procedure or Substance? 
 
A. Waldron’s Procedural Solution 
 
 Waldron defends majoritarianism – the view that the citizen majority’s view on any given 
political matter should be decisive in a democratic system – as the institution that maximizes the 
principles of fairness to the degree possible. He is open to the possibility that other decision 
procedures may result in substantively better or fairer outcomes than a system of 
majoritarianism. However, he argues that reasonable disagreement extends to all substantive 
conceptions of fair outcomes, and so accepts the confines of an “implausibly narrow 
understanding of equal respect.” The only available reasons to justify a political decision 
procedure to all citizens are then process-related reasons: “reasons for insisting that some person 
make, or participate in making, a given decision that stand independently of considerations about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 229. 
12 Gerald Gaus refers to these principles collectively as the “principle of political equality…[such] that no 
citizen’s judgments are public recognized as superior to any other’s.” Gerald Gaus, “Public Justification 
and Democratic Adjudication,” 19. 
13 David Estlund makes this important point, claiming “if we are willing to treat the positions of even 
decent citizens as beneath our respect [i.e. as unreasonable], it is far from clear that we meant what we 
said in adopting the liberal view that political legitimacy requires justifiability to each and every citizen.” 
David Estlund, “Jeremy Waldron on Law and Disagreement,” 115. 
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the appropriate outcome.”14 He goes so far as to suggest “majority-decision is the only decision-
procedure consistent with equal respect in this necessarily impoverished sense” that excludes 
substantive fairness considerations that are subject to reasonable disagreement.15  
 Waldron defends majoritarianism on several fronts and, in line with the pertinent criteria, 
attempts to supply only process-related reasons for accepting majoritarianism. He defends 
majoritarianism as satisfying principles of fairness – namely equality and respect – subject to the 
exclusion of substantive fairness considerations.  
First, Waldron rightly assumes that there is widespread consensus that all individuals 
have rights, but that there is reasonable disagreement as to the nature of those rights – contrary 
views are construed as unreasonable.16 Since there is no access to an objective assessment of the 
nature of those rights, then no one individual or group is to be consulted to the exclusion of any 
others as an expert. Given that widespread disagreement about rights in the circumstances of 
politics are a permanent feature of our society, the result is a fundamental right to participate in 
all important political decisions that bear on the question of rights, what Waldron calls the “right 
of rights.”17 This does not preclude the inclusion of other rights as fundamental, but leaves the 
question as to what those rights are to the people.18 In the context of disagreement about rights, 
submitting to the careful deliberation of right-bearers on equal terms – of whom the decision 
immediately affects – is appropriate and consistent with the respect associated with the belief 
that all do indeed have rights.19 
With the “right of rights” as the defining characteristic of majoritarianism, the decision-
procedure inherently expresses respect toward individuals as equally capable and responsible 
right-bearers – i.e. equal political status. Consensus that all should be attributed rights in the first 
place, Waldron argues, respects individuals as morally responsible agents, as rights “provide an 
individual with a protected choice on an issue which remains morally significant.”20 The moral 
significance is in part contained in the fact that the right-bearer may make the wrong choice – 
most importantly where other individuals are affected. An attribution of any right is then an act 
of faith that assumes a positive depiction of human beings as capable of careful contemplation on 
important issues, and – more importantly – responsible in their decision-making on salient issues 
that affect others. Thus, majoritarianism grants equal political status and respect by recognizing a 
fundamental right to participate that does not depend upon any controversial, substantive moral 
view. 
Second, majoritarianism accords “equal potential decisiveness”21 to the opinions and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 1372. 
15 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 116 (emphasis added). 
16 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 211. 
17 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 232; Almost all decisions of a polity bear on rights in some capacity 
upon close examination. In any case, people will disagree on which issues do and do not implicate rights, 
and so almost all political issues will be brought into the fold as subject to the decision of all citizens on 
the basis of their right to participate.   
18 It may seem odd to leave it an open question of what rights are fundamental. However, this is because 
Waldron’s assumption of disagreement in the circumstances of politics denies objective access to what 
constitutes fundamental rights. We can never be sure that the people are correct, but for the reasons I 
argue, subjecting the question to the people is the most appropriate manner to go about formulating what 
are thought to be fundamental rights. 
19 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 222. 
20 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 250. 
21 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 114. 
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views of all citizens – i.e. equal political impact. Each citizen’s vote counts for no more or less 
than the vote of another. This is because it is not beyond reasonable disagreement among citizens 
that one view should be privileged over another. Though equal political status itself might be 
interpreted as requiring equal political impact – as a recognition of their equal political status – 
the distinction is helpful because the former directs attention to the decision-makers and the latter 
to the beneficial features of the decision mechanism through which the decision-makers act – 
though both must be construed as highlighting aspects of the decision procedure. 
Additionally, majoritarianism fares comparatively better than other procedures on solely 
fair procedural considerations. Let us consider two examples, a coin-toss and submitting to the 
will of an absolute sovereign. A coin-toss respects the political status of some individuals in the 
choice of possible outcomes – “we would not use the coin-toss to choose among options that 
nobody favours.”22 In fact, in the case where there are only two possible outcomes favored by the 
citizens, the coin-toss can be construed as respecting the political status of all. This is the case, 
because positive weight is given to the set of preferences that are in contestation. Additionally, 
decisive political impact is afforded to all citizens only in the event that all share the same view, 
because we would attribute to either possible outcome – i.e. heads or tails – the view that all 
citizens favor.23 In submitting to the will of an absolute sovereign, only the views of the 
sovereign are considered, and they are absolute in their decisiveness.24 In this way, there is only 
recognition of the political status and impact of one individual, namely the sovereign. Both 
decision procedures lack the level of procedural fairness that is implicit in a system of 
majoritarianism. 
Note that a feature of the fundamental right to participate enshrined in Waldron’s 
majoritarianism is that it confines the majority to decisions or procedures that are always subject 
to change by a future majority. Since it is defended as a more fair procedure than the alternatives, 
however, this feature is not to be regretted, but is instead beneficial. 
 
B. Dworkin’s Substantive Solution 
 
 Ronald Dworkin, in Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 
argues that political institutions ought to be designed in a way that citizens are substantively 
treated “with equal concern and respect.”25 When institutions “provide and respect 
the…[substantive] conditions [of equality], then the verdicts of these institutions should be 
accepted by everyone for that reason.”26 Otherwise, they should not. In contrast to Waldron, 
Dworkin argues that not all conceptions of substantive equality and respect are subject to 
reasonable disagreement, or at least that we can design our institutions in uncontroversial ways 
that are conducive to securing substantive rights – e.g. a system of judicial review that is 
insulated from the public would conceivably be more conducive to better deliberation and 
protection of rights.27  
 Further, this view is not inherently against majoritarian decision procedures in all 
circumstances. To the contrary, Dworkin accepts that a minimal degree of citizen participation is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 113. 
23 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 113. 
24 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 114. 
25 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 17. 
26 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 17 (emphasis added). 
27 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 31. 
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a prerequisite for moral membership in a community, which is conducive to substantive political 
equality. Partly for this reason, he endorses democracy as the most preferable – and the only 
legitimate – type of government.28  
Additionally, he embraces a constitutional form of democracy that entrenches abstract 
political rights – against majority rule – that can be agreed upon by all reasonable citizens as 
minimum conditions for the legitimacy of the government. Reasonable citizens “agree that the 
majority should not always be the final judge of when its own power should be limited to protect 
individual rights.”29  
 This view is quite intuitive. If we can know that certain institutions are more likely to get 
matters right, then why choose another institution? Recall that we want to maximally satisfy the 
principles of fairness – i.e. equality and respect – and if we can substantively do so in a manner 
that is uncontroversial, as Dworkin supposes, then we should prefer his conception of a 
constitutional democracy.30 
 
IV. Procedure over Substance 
 
It bears mentioning that, at a general level, Dworkin and Waldron are not so 
fundamentally opposed. Both are interested in satisfying basic conditions of equality and respect. 
What separates them, fundamentally, is that Waldron limits himself to an “impoverished sense” 
of equal respect, given deep disagreement concerning more robust substantive equality and 
respect.31 The question is whether or not Waldron’s handicap is necessary. I want to argue that it 
is, and that Dworkin’s non-majoritarian democracy implicitly conveys disrespect for citizens in a 
way that reasonable citizens would reject. 
 
A. Non-Majoritarian Institutions Subject to Disagreement 
 
  Non-majoritarian institutions contain unelected offices that carry political authority 
unobtainable by, and not directly responsive to, the majority of citizens, and so an individual or 
group other than the majority may be decisive with regard to important political issues. In an 
absolute monarchy, for example, one individual carries absolute political authority in matters that 
affect all citizens. If all reasonable citizens support a non-majoritarian institution, then the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 24. 
29 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 16. 
30 Waldron’s majoritarian argument was helpfully portrayed as extending equal political status and impact 
to citizens. However, recall that these features are only determinative if we do not have agreement on 
robust, substantive political issues or manners of deciding. For example, if we are in agreement that 
college-educated citizens make more wise decisions about important fundamental rights, then we do not 
want equal political impact. In fact, we want the college-educated citizens to have a disproportionate 
political impact. Equal political impact is not desirable in all scenarios.  
 It is hard to accept that any reasonable theory would reject equal political status as an important 
criterion in satisfying principles of fairness, if we accept that individuals have rights. In that case, citizens 
should at least be equally recognized as the appropriate group to decide on contentious matters, even if 
the impact of their vote is unequal. There is of course a worry of whether or not equal political status can 
be separated from equal political impact in this manner. I will show in my response to Dworkin’s 
objections that it is indeed not possible, and that non-majoritarian institutions inherently lack equal 
political status. 
31 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 116. 
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institution would be legitimate. Though we can easily conclude that an absolute monarchy is 
subject to reasonable disagreement, the same cannot be so quickly concluded with regard to all 
forms of non-majoritarian democracy.  
In a non-majoritarian democracy, though the majority is not always decisive, care is 
taken to bring about conditions of fairness in the citizenry. This form of democracy could still 
include important participatory features, but at least in some cases, the majority would not be 
decisive. A constitution might entrench certain rights agreed upon in the abstract, though a 
limited group deemed competent – due to training or experience – might interpret the application 
of these rights. In such a system, equal political impact is absent, because such a system 
presupposes agreement that the opinion of some ought to have greater impact than others. This is 
unproblematic so long as this agreement is beyond reasonable disagreement, but I will show later 
that it is not. Additionally, there is a worry that a non-majoritarian democracy – though including 
prevalent participatory features – cannot maintain the equal political status of its citizens. I take it 
that this is a more basic condition of fairness that depicts citizens as equally capable in abilities – 
at least prior to training – to participate in collective decision-making in a morally responsible 
and significant manner. 
Dworkin argues that majoritarian democracies do not uniquely establish the politically 
equal status of its citizens as capable to participate in collective decision-making in a morally 
responsible and significant manner. Rather, he argues, equality in political status can be present 
in a non-majoritarian democracy as well. In a non-majoritarian democracy, all citizens are 
eligible – in principle – to partake in an unelected office that carries political authority.32 For this 
reason, differences in political authority need not be an expression of unequal political status, but 
rather – as Dworkin seems to suggest – a manifestation of citizens’ pursuit of their own diverse 
interests.33 When important decisions on substantive issues are made, there is nothing inherently 
disrespectful in considering – as determinative – the views of unelected citizens.  
 However, I think it is clear that disproportionately centering political authority on 
unelected offices effectually eliminates the possibility of attaining those positions for some even 
though everyone is in principle eligible. Take, for example, the position of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, who carry a disproportionate amount of political authority over citizens. A substantial 
number of citizens undoubtedly desire such a position, and it is reasonable to assume that a 
substantial number of citizens decide to pursue those positions early on. Inevitably, so long as 
the demand is higher than the supply, some will lose out. In fact, as certain offices acquire more 
political authority, we can expect that more citizens will desire those positions, and so more will 
disproportionately lack political authority that desired it in the first place. Hence, the situation is 
one where – though a large number desire to have a say on important issues – citizens are turned 
away as somehow inferior, or perhaps unlucky when compared to their competitors. 
 Since it is inevitable that unelected or appointed positions will not be available to all that 
desire them, the question arises of why those that acquired the positions of political authority 
should be heard over others. The answer must ultimately turn on some sort of competence of the 
unelected officials that allowed them to acquire positions over their competitors. That is, on 
substantive issues, unelected officials have somehow been determined to have a tendency to 
make better decisions than their competitors. 
A couple of points should tell against Dworkin’s view. First, in the case that two or more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This must be differentiated from majoritarian democracies, where unelected offices would never carry 
political authority over the citizens, since the majorities view is to always be decisive. 
33 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 28. 
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citizens are judged equally competent for an unelected position carrying political authority, the 
citizen given the unelected position can only be chosen arbitrarily. So when the citizen or 
citizens not chosen – that are equally competent – ask for a reason why they should listen to the 
position-holding citizen, there is no reason that can comfort them, since the reason of greater 
competence is unavailable. I take it that this worry applies to many important political positions, 
including that of the unelected justices of the Supreme Court.  
Second – and more fundamentally – we have to consider the criteria used to judge the 
competence of applicants for unelected offices. Presumably, the individual judging applicants as 
more or less competent in important political issues must also be competent so as to be able to 
identify the varying levels of competence of the applicants. This presents a worry, because we 
seem not to have independent criteria by which to judge competence. To choose a judge that is 
competent in choosing a competent applicant, we need a further judge to choose the competent 
judge ad infinitum.34 At some point we must reach a judge of applicants that was arbitrarily 
chosen, causing a similarly arbitrary effect on all the judges chosen afterwards. If this is the case, 
there is no substantive reason that we should have unelected positions, and so we should subject 
those positions to an election by the people.  
 Dworkin might claim that there are independent criteria upon which to judge 
competency. In fact, he suggests that existing constitutions enshrine such independent criteria, 
though he alludes to their creation as a “mysterious matter,” where our maintaining their 
provisions is “out of a sense that stability cannot otherwise be had.”35 He writes that so long as 
“the public largely accepts [a particular reading of a constitution]…we have no reason to resist 
that reading and to strain for one that seems more congenial to a majoritarian philosophy.”36 
 It is hard to understand the implications of this more practical view of Dworkin, primarily 
because it is out of line with his substantive requirements of political equality. Considerations of 
practicality and stability are secondary to that of a constitution’s embodiment of political 
equality. The key concession in Dworkin’s acceptance of a constitution seems to be public 
acceptance of a particular interpretation of a constitution. No citizen would accept a reading that 
conveyed inherent disrespect to themself. However, the public disagrees about important matters 
of political rights enshrined in constitutional documents, and there is no single interpretation 
accepted by the public. In the case that public consensus exists, then there would be no worry in 
subjecting the constitution to majoritarian change – i.e. a non-entrenched constitution. 
In relation to Dworkin’s argument that a non-majoritarian democracy can respect the 
equal political status of its citizens, it is clear that the unelected offices of such a democracy 
inherently enjoy unequal political status when more than one competent person desires an 
unelected office – which we can presume is the case in any office that holds political authority 
over others. A citizen applicant is given no reason that is not arbitrary as to why another should 
obtain an unelected political office over him, and more generally is not given any reason why 
another should have political authority over themself or others. A non-majoritarian democracy is 
inherently disrespectful to citizens as reasoners capable of reflecting on important political issues 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 This claim is limited if an uncontroversial standard exists at some level, but as I have mentioned and I 
note in the subsequent paragraphs, there are no identifiable independent criteria upon which to rely on. As 
I point out, even Dworkin, though perhaps unintentionally, only finds an independent measurable 
standard through public acceptance. Though, on closer examination, public acceptance actually works 
against his theory, as I shall demonstrate. 
35 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 34. 
36 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 35. 
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where there is no consensus on independent criteria of competent reasoning about rights, and so 
is subject to reasonable disagreement.  
 
B. Majoritarianism Defense Against Objections 
 
 Conceding the provision of equal political status in a majoritarian democracy, Dworkin 
offers two main objections against Waldron’s claim that majoritarianism provides equal potential 
decisiveness to citizens’ opinions.  
 
(i) Favored Representative 
 
First, given the representative democracy that Waldron argues is necessitated by the 
current state of nations, Dworkin objects that an ordinary citizen’s opinion on an issue carries 
substantially less decisional weight than any given legislative representative’s view on that same 
issue.37  
It is indisputable that a representative democracy necessarily favors the views of 
legislative representatives over their constituents. When important votes on substantive issues 
arise within a national legislature, the only votes that matter directly in that particular instance 
are those of the constituents’ representatives. 
Before responding, I think it is important to note that there is disagreement as to the 
proper role of a representative in the first place. In what is often referred to as the delegate 
model, a representative’s proper role is simply to determine the expressed preferences of their 
constituents – i.e. the majority’s preferences – and act upon them. Alternatively, the trustee 
model defines the proper role of a representative as acting upon what he or she – the elected 
official – believes to be the best course of action.38 The latter model suggests that constituents 
vote for the individual rather than their alignment with their own preferences. Dworkin’s 
objection assumes something like the delegate model, where the constituents vote for a 
representative to express their own preferences. If he meant the trustee model, then it would not 
be controversial that the representative’s preferences are favored, because it is the will of the 
constituent that the representative act on his own preferences in that case. 
In response, Waldron claims, “[w]e accept that for practical reasons not everyone can 
participate directly,” and thus a representative legislature is necessitated.39 Key to this response 
is that the people agree to a representative form of democracy. “If people thought significant 
experience was being slighted, or significant opinion overlooked, in the process of legislation, 
then it…[is] perfectly appropriate on this model for them to complain and to do something about 
it.”40Again, he does not make the distinction that Dworkin suggests, but rather – and I think 
rightly – implicitly sets the contentious issue aside. Whether we accept the trustee or the delegate 
model is something that can be determined by the constituents themselves. In fact, individual 
localities may predominantly subscribe to one or another model. It is up to the people to decide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 27. 
38 Suzanne Dovi, “Political Representation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011). 
39 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 54. 
40 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 66; Note that such a response would be unavailable to Dworkin, 
because he endorses authority placed in unelected, lifetime-appointed offices. 
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how best to be represented.41 
In response to Dworkin’s objection, then, final political authority rests in the people, and 
a representative – including all his votes on political matters – is only in his position, because the 
people (of a particular constituency) chose him. In a majoritarian system – where the majority’s 
view is decisive – a constituent need only to garner support from fellow constituents, and if 
enough of them agreed on a particular view – i.e. a majority – they could either vote for a 
representative that holds their view or pursue some other existing mechanism in their system.42 
Additionally, if they felt direct democracy was more appropriate for their society, they need only 
have a majority that agree with them in a majoritarian system to make that change. At a basic 
level, citizens retain equal potential decisiveness in a majoritarian democracy. The people decide 
not only on their representatives, but also on the system wherein their representatives act. They 
control both, and can at anytime work to change what they find unacceptable. 
 
(ii) Political Inequalities of Wealth 
 
In his second objection, Dworkin argues that majoritarianism – in and of itself – does not 
address the more gross political inequalities due to inequalities of wealth. Inequalities of wealth 
amplify the impact of the small minority of the population that constitute the wealthiest citizens 
of modern democracies through a greater ability to convince others of their opinions – e.g. 
saturating the media with one-sided views on an issue.43 
 First, Waldron might argue that inequalities of wealth do not have the effect Dworkin 
claims. Recall that if we agree that all citizens should have rights – which we do – then we also 
believe that citizens are capable of deliberating on important political issues that affect others.44 
Even where a correlation supports the notion that money can buy support on an issue, respect for 
citizens as capable and responsible deliberators requires that this conclusion not be drawn.  
 Second – and in relation to the first point – majoritarianism does not prescribe a fixed 
institution, where existing problems are somehow set in stone. It is a mode of operation for 
society, within which right-bearers will address important issues such as gross inequalities of 
wealth and their impact on political decisions. In fact, majoritarianism is neutral as to outcomes, 
and that is a benefit of the system. Even in our own society, campaign finance reform – to 
address inequalities of political impact – has been pushed in a majoritarian manner, though 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 I recognize that there is likely a mixed view among citizens as to which model should predominate, and 
in what circumstances. This is perfectly consistent with what I am claiming; it is up to the constituents to 
choose their representative, and if they do not act in the manner they wish, they can choose a different 
representative in the next election or follow whatever mechanisms exist within their own democratic 
system. 
42 Remember that Waldron is envisaging a majoritarian system, which is different from the American-
style democracy in that the majority’s view is decisive. This important point must be considered in all his 
responses. However, even in the American-style democracy, there are informal mechanisms that a 
majority may pursue; I am not suggesting that informal mechanisms be the only mechanisms. To get an 
idea of these mechanisms, Larry Kramer suggests “political-legal” mechanisms that have been 
historically used, including petitions, public meetings, exerting control over local governmental 
institutions, and even legitimate mobbing. Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular 
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 24-29.  
43 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 27. 
44 See “Section III: A. Waldron’s Procedural Solution.” 
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qualified by a very small group of judges in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission.45 
In a majoritarian system, such elitist control over the majority would not be possible, though 
again it would allow for delegated authority in an elected, representative body. Though 
majoritarianism does not necessarily resolve the effects Dworkin claims are caused by 
inequalities of wealth, neither does it require those same inequalities. Instead, it provides a 
mechanism to resolve social inequalities. 
 Third, it is important to understand that there is not unanimous agreement on how to 
resolve the issue of the disproportionate political impact of the wealthy. As Citizens United 
makes evident – applied to campaign financing – we have to at least consider the balance of 
other rights important to equal political impact when addressing the issue – e.g. freedom of 
speech in Citizens United. To put it more directly, there is a general consensus that a democracy 
should not allow disproportionate political impact of the wealthy, but there is reasonable 
disagreement as to how to address the issue and balance it with other important rights.46 Majority 
decision is a way to rectify this reasonable disagreement. 
 
C. What Can Majoritarianism Guarantee? 
 
 Not much. Majoritarianism can only guarantee procedural equality embodied in a 
fundamental right to participate, what Waldron calls the “right of rights.” Independently, it 
cannot establish the kind of substantive equality that Dworkin is clearly suggesting should be 
required of a democracy. However, as we have seen, Dworkin’s constitutional democracy also 
cannot independently establish substantive equality in a way that would be free of reasonable 
disagreement, and so it is illegitimate. In this way, majoritarianism is fair, because it does not 
privilege the views of any citizens where there is reasonable disagreement on the matter, but 
instead counts each citizen’s view on a matter equally with all others with the majority view 
being decisive. 
 
V. Majoritarianism as Controversial 
 
Setting aside disagreement over substance, the question now arises whether Waldron’s 
procedure is itself uncontroversial. Is majoritarianism subject to reasonable disagreement? 
 
A. Majority in a Lifeboat: A Controversial Case 
 
Dworkin, in Justice for Hedgehogs, argues “that the majoritarian decision principle is 
not…a general principle of fairness independent of context – that is, an ‘intrinsically’ fair 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010); The use of this case here is not 
to say the Supreme Court was correct or incorrect in its decision. The point is to show that the 
disproportionate political impact of the wealthy is an acknowledged political issue and there are citizens 
making steps to restrict effects of wealth in politics. Additionally, this example shows – in respect to 
campaigns – how the issue is not so simple as simply blocking excessive contributions, because there are 
other rights that need to be considered – e.g. freedom of speech. 
46 This is an important point about abstract rights generally. In one sense, some might plausibly argue that 
most people can roughly agree upon a list of rights that they find important to democracy – the Bill of 
Rights is a testament to this. However, each individual’s conception of what those rights entail can vary 
tremendously, including the balance of all the rights taken together. 
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process.”47 To support this conclusion, he presents an example: “[w]hen a lifeboat is 
overcrowded and one passenger must be thrown over else all will die, it would not be fair to hold 
a vote so that the least popular among them would be drowned. It would be fairer to draw lots.”48  
If Waldron’s majoritarianism is controversial as an intrinsically fair procedure in at least 
one case – which the lifeboat example is meant to show – then the decision procedure itself must 
be called into question as subject to reasonable disagreement. If there is reasonable 
disagreement, it does not seem that majoritarianism has the original appeal of a procedure that all 
would be willing to accept, despite the fact that they may not agree with the outcomes produced. 
 In response, Waldron makes a critical distinction between “majority-decision-as-to-
principles” and “majority-decision-as-to-particulars,”49 with the latter always appropriately 
subject to the former. In relation to the lifeboat example, the latter may not be a real option – 
likely repugnant to the passengers – but the former would be used to decide among decision 
procedures to decide who is to be thrown overboard. In short, a majority decision is not 
appropriate in all “first-order issues of justice…[but it is] for choosing among general rules.”50 
Further, this just is what democratic legislatures are empowered to do – making general rules that 
are to apply to all citizens.51 It seems, then, that there is not reasonable disagreement about 
majoritarianism as a principle, but only in particular contexts. 
However, Dworkin points out, it seems that even in making general rules or legislation, 
the use of the majoritarian principle is controversial in cases where the majority determines the 
rights of disliked minorities.52 Instead, Dworkin insists that we should design the institution so as 
to protect citizens from the “tyranny of the majority.” Stephen Macedo, in “Against 
Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design,” argues on the basis of a similar 
worry that “[f]airness requires that institutions should speak to the vulnerable perspective of 
minorities and not simply lump them in with everyone else.”53 
 In defense, Waldron first clarifies what is meant by “tyranny of the majority,” defining it 
as a case “in which people care little for minority or individual rights other than their own.”54 
Important to this definition is the realization that “[p]eople…do not necessarily have the rights 
they think they have,” and so a minority group is not under tyranny simply in virtue of their 
opinion of their rights not prevailing within the community.55 Rather, minority groups are under 
tyranny when their interests are not taken into account by the rest of the community in their 
formulation of an opinion on a matter. 
 In response to Macedo’s more general worry that minority groups should be given special 
attention, he supplies his own solution that “supermajority voting rules in which minority 
interests gain special protection are often preferable.”56 Macedo suggests “we all might prefer 
these systems given the possibility of finding ourselves in the minority.”57 However, isn’t the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ronald Dworkin, “Response,” 1085-1086. 
48 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 387. 
49 Jeremy Waldron, “A Majority in the Lifeboat,” 1051. 
50 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” Footnote 112 (emphasis added). 
51 Waldron, “A Majority in the Lifeboat,” 1050. 
52 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 387. 
53 Stephen Macedo, “Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design,” 1038. 
54 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1346. 
55 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1346. 
56 Macedo, “Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design,” 1037-1038. 
57 Macedo, “Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design,” 1038. 
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more reasonable view simply to treat minority groups with respect and take their views into 
consideration when deliberating on important political issues that affect them? An appeal to the 
golden rule would provide for a more congenial environment. In the case that a previous 
majority-member citizen does find himself in the minority on a particular issue, he can find 
comfort in the expectation of careful consideration of his own views by the new majority.  
In fact, instituting barriers such as supermajority voting rules breeds an environment of 
distrust for the future actions of the majority. It forces the minority to find solace in an institution 
rather than the community, and will tend to decrease the need for meaningful dialogue with the 
majority, which is important to any political environment – i.e. the minority need not 
meaningfully discuss issues where it knows that the other side only has a majority. It will make 
tyranny of the supermajority – if it were to occur – much worse than if it were of the majority, 
because the supermajority would have a much weaker relationship with the minority than would 
occur in a majoritarian institution. Additionally, if a supermajority were to institute political 
changes in a supermajoritarian institution that did not take the minority’s interests into 
consideration – and thus making it tyrannical – the obstacles to change would be insurmountably 
more difficult for the minority group than if in a majoritarian institution. If a citizen were to ask 
the government why a supermajority voting rule is in place, the government must say: “we don’t 
trust our citizens to treat minorities with respect, including you.” If a citizen were to ask the same 
question to a government with a majority voting rule, the government must say: “we value your 
opinion equally with all citizens, and your opinion has maximum potential decisiveness 
consistent with that equality.”  
I think Waldron must concede that tyranny of the majority is a possibility. But he should 
also note that this is not unique to majoritarian institutions. Oppression by the ruling group is a 
possibility in all political institutions. This is the case even in Dworkin’s non-majoritarain 
democracy that includes checks on the majority through, e.g., judicial review. Working within 
Waldron’s definition of tyranny, it is certainly possible – and perhaps to be expected – that, for 
example, Justices on the Supreme Court will not always take into consideration the interests of 
minority groups.58 The same possibility holds true for any political institution. Also, experience 
in a diverse contemporary society suggests that actual instances of tyranny of the majority are 
quite rare, perhaps for the reasons I’ve suggested above – namely that it incentivizes the majority 
to treat the minority well due to uncertainty in future political membership.59 In the first place, 
this partially alleviates such worries. Secondly, it adds empirical support to the view that citizens 
are capable and responsible deliberators on important political issues, which Waldron has 
previously argued is an essential depiction of citizens if we believe they are deserving of rights.60 
Recall, however, that majoritarianism must be free of reasonable disagreement if it is to be 
acceptable, and so simply alleviating worries does not eliminate the principle as controversial. 
In his newest formulation of his argument, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 In “Section VI: Judicial Review,” I describe the focus on judicial review as misguided. Instead, it is the 
absence of a majority’s ability to overturn decisions made through the power of judicial review. I only 
mention this to qualify my example of oppression by a ruling group. In this example, and since a 
supermajority has the final say in American-style government (I discuss this in Section VI), the 
oppression is in reality by the supermajority that acquiesces to the decisions of the Court. In either case, 
the possibility of tyranny remains, and as I’ve alluded to earlier, one might worry that tyranny of the 
supermajority is indeed worse than tyranny of the majority. 
59 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1401. 
60 See “Section III. A. Waldron’s Procedural Solution.” 
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Review,” Waldron restricts his case to those societies that already have a commitment to robust 
minority rights. As Waldron puts it, the applicable societies “believe that minorities are entitled 
to a degree of support, recognition, and insulation that is not necessarily guaranteed by their 
numbers or by their political weight.”61 This assumption – going beyond the commitment to a 
mere “right of rights” – seems to be a concession that majoritarianism is controversial as a 
general principle, because it places as a necessary condition what was originally supposed to be a 
matter of faith in the majority. However, I believe that Waldron’s most recent concession is 
unnecessary in defending his original formulation as uncontroversial. 
In attributing rights to citizens, Waldron has shown that we must also be depicting 
citizens as capable and responsible deliberators on important political issues that affect others. If 
we did not think that citizens could decide responsibly – and allow for cases where they might be 
wrong – then we should not make such great efforts to protect rights in the first place. What is 
the value in protecting citizens’ rights if we can always expect that they will simply abuse them 
to cause harm to others? Oppression is a possibility no matter who has political authority. We 
must simply accept the possibility of tyranny of the majority if we value rights. 
In order to draw out this intuition, I think it is important to understand what we mean in 
talking about rights. A right grants a protected choice on a matter as illustrated earlier in the 
defense of Waldron’s majoritarianism. For example, imagine a right to freedom of speech gives a 
right-bearer the ability to speak in a public place in any manner he wishes – to the extent that it 
does not conflict with others’ rights.62 The right-bearer may give a speech with malevolent 
intentions that offends a particular group. Alternatively, the right-bearer may give a speech with 
benevolent intentions that promotes a minimum level of welfare, beneath which the right-bearer 
proposes the community should provide support. If the citizen indeed bears a right to freedom of 
speech – and supposing the two above cases do not conflict with any other rights – then the right-
bearer may engage in either scenario. We cannot guarantee that the right-bearer will choose to 
engage in the benevolent-intentioned speech, even though we would prefer it. In fact, we cannot 
guarantee that the right-bearer will make any use of his right. In relation to rights more generally, 
if we truly attribute a right to citizens, no result – good or bad – can be guaranteed. 
In discussing rights in this manner, Waldron’s intuitive idea becomes clearer. Accepting 
that there is widespread disagreement about rights – what they are and the extent of their 
protections – it seems particularly odd for an individual or group to claim that all citizens indeed 
have rights, but that the individual or group will decide what those rights are. How can we know 
that this particular individual or group will tend to reach more correct decisions than a majority 
where there is no procedure-independent measurement? There is the possibility of tyranny in 
either case. However, majoritarianism is more consistent with the assumptions that followed our 
attribution of rights in the first place – namely that all citizens are capable and responsible 
reasoners about rights. To question this assumption is to question whether all citizens should 
have rights, which Waldron’s original formulation rightly counts on our not questioning. 
 
B. Folding Substance Back Into Procedure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1364. 
62 Note that this analysis applies to negative rights as well, which can be formulated positively. For 
example, a right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures might conversely be formulated 
as a right to privacy in the home. It makes no difference that we cannot perfectly formulate a negative 
right positively, as it is simply a result of the disagreement and confusion that these abstract rights 
represent. 
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 Though I agree with Waldron’s view that majoritarianism is a fair procedure, there is the 
worry that he is building substantive claims into his concept of fairness that could be subject to 
reasonable disagreement – “folding substance back into procedure.”63 Recall that the appeal of 
Waldron’s view was that it did not appeal to substantive claims, which he has convinced us are 
all subject to reasonable disagreement, and so unable to ground a legitimate decision-mechanism. 
In a review of Law and Disagreement, David Estlund argues that Waldron’s majoritarianism 
cannot be defended as fair on the basis of purely procedural considerations and instead requires a 
substantive justification. 
 First, Estlund argues that Waldron’s majoritarianism lacks what he refers to as full 
anonymity or insensitivity to the personal features of those involved in the pertinent decision 
procedure.64 A majority decision procedure is sensitive to personal features of the individuals – 
namely their preferences for a particular outcome.  A coin toss, he argues, is an example of a 
decision procedure that does have full anonymity, in that the chances of one outcome or the other 
remains constant independent of any individuals’ preferences for one or the other outcome. 
According to Estlund, full anonymity is necessary to a procedure’s claim to fairness on 
procedural considerations alone.65  
 Estlund does not argue that the lack of full anonymity necessitates overall unfairness – 
i.e. substantive unfairness. For example, there might be substantive reasons to think that a 
majority of citizens are more likely than a coin toss to choose the correct decision in resolution 
of any particular political issue. Waldron, however, does not argue on the basis of substantively 
fair outcomes, because of deep-seated disagreement about what counts as such. Since a majority 
decision-procedure is not fully anonymous, and because any substantive reasons for endorsing 
majority decision are subject to reasonable disagreement under Waldron’s theory, then 
majoritarianism is unavailable to Waldron both on purely procedural and substantive grounds. 
 Even if Waldron’s majoritarianism could hold up on substantive grounds of fairness, 
Estlund argues that they do not provide a basis to prefer majority decision to other possible 
decision procedures. Estlund defines the principle to defend: “giving each person the greatest 
possible chance of being decisive compatible with everyone’s having an equal chance.”66 
Without a defense of this evidently substantive principle, a coin toss might be just as good as a 
majority decision on substantive grounds. Again, given that Waldron defines substantive fairness 
considerations as outside the purview of available defenses of a decision-procedure, Estlund 
suggests that Waldron’s majoritarianism seems fated as insufficiently unmotivated. 
 Estlund’s critique of Waldron’s majoritarianism suggests an important point with regard 
to choosing a decision procedure based on fair procedural considerations. Though a coin toss is 
more procedurally fair than majoritarianism, we would expect reasonable citizens to reject a coin 
toss as a legitimate decision procedure for salient political issues, and even Waldron agrees on 
this point. He comments, in regard to coin tossing, “[n]o one would think that an appropriate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 116. 
64 David Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, 80. 
65 This claim at first appears to be contrary to Estlund’s view, stating “[w]e should not say that 
procedures…are not fair simply because they are not fully anonymous[;]...procedures can mix fairness 
and other principles, remaining fair.” However, this claim must be interpreted as defining “other 
principles” as substantive in nature. To support this, Estlund goes on, “[a]nything less than full anonymity 
imports nonprocedural…values.” Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, 81. 
66 Estlund, “Jeremy Waldron on Law and Disagreement,”120. 
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basis for determining which propositions should be accorded authority as sources of law.”67 
Estlund suggests similarly that there is nothing especially helpful about considering only 
procedural fairness. Instead, we need a decision procedure with at least some element of 
substantive fairness. Of course, Estlund also recognizes the disagreement that is the focus of 
Waldron’s work, and does not suggest an account that puts forth full-fledged conceptions of the 
good. Rather, he finds that we ought to select a decision procedure that tends “to get things right 
from the standpoint of justice or common good whatever the best conception of those might 
be.”68 This introduction of substance, Estlund argues, should be uncontroversial. 
First, I want to address Estlund’s narrow conception of procedural fairness, which I will 
argue leads to a bizarre and unacceptable conception of what is ordinarily meant by procedural 
fairness. Estlund claims that a coin toss has the feature of full anonymity. However, that is not 
quite correct. Thomas Christiano points out that in a coin toss, “the set of alternatives is set in 
advance…[and so] the outcome is still dependent on the preferences of the...contending 
parties.”69 The result, Christiano claims, is that “the procedurally fairest way to decide [in any 
scenario] is to set up a lottery over all possible alternatives.”70 He rightly claims that this is a 
“perverse” characterization of procedural fairness. I think Christiano is accurate in his claim, but 
I want to push his suggestion a little further.  
Though Christiano suggests that a random decision-mechanism is the only fair procedure 
that can be conceived of as having full anonymity, I will show that decision-mechanisms that 
resolve an issue coherently must necessarily incorporate substance. Imagine, for example, two 
friends discussing what they should do for the day. Both of the friends disagree fundamentally on 
what the best thing to do would be, such that doing what one of the friends prefers would 
preclude engagement in the other friend’s preferred activity. They both agree to use a decision-
mechanism that is procedurally fair, and so they first choose to flip a coin. As we learned from 
Christiano, however, the possible outcomes of a coin toss are dependent on the preferences of the 
two individuals, and so they instead choose to submit their decision to a randomization machine. 
This machine will select from every possible activity for the day as a possible choice. By 
restricting the set of outcomes to activities that can be done on that day, however, the 
randomization machine gives positive weight to the question of which activities could be 
engaged in on that day – i.e. it lacks full anonymity. In this way, it is still sensitive to the two 
friends’ preferences that the decision-mechanism decide on an activity and one that can be done 
on that day. The two friends then consult another randomization that does not have this 
restriction – it will provide an answer to any matter of disagreement – but because it is 
unrestricted in possible outcomes, there will be no necessary connection between the original 
disagreement to be resolved and the response received. The result is an incoherent decision-
mechanism. For coherence, a decision-mechanism must be sensitive to the context of the 
decision, and thus at least thinly substantive. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 89 (original emphasis added). 
68 Estlund, “Jeremy Waldron on Law and Disagreement,” 122 (original emphasis added); Waldron 
appears to recognize this point in “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” from Aileen 
Kavanagh, who suggests a similarly modest instrumental view. However, it is hard to say that his 
discussion of “outcome-related reasons” is sincere, since the indeterminacy that resulted from his 
comparison of judicial review and majoritarianism is compatible with his view of substantive 
disagreement. Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1373-1374. 
69 Thomas Christiano, “Debate: Estlund on Democratic Authority,” 231. 
70 Christiano, “Debate: Estlund on Democratic Authority,” 231. 
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In our preoccupation with obtaining a procedure with full anonymity, we have been led 
away from the original point, which was to decide the activity for the day. We might have been 
okay with a decision-mechanism that is random in the way that Christiano originally suggested. 
However, pushing Estlund’s view of pure proceduralism to its limits leads to an even stronger 
perversity in his characterization of a fair procedure. Any procedure that truly has the feature of 
full anonymity would seem bizarre in its incoherence as a means of resolving any disagreement.  
 The appeal of fair procedure does not rest in some unattainable concept of full 
anonymity, but rather – as Christiano suggests – in its capacity “to exclude factors that are not 
supposed to make a difference.”71 These irrelevant factors are “determined by the nature of the 
task involved.”72 For example, we intuitively think it fair to exclude the influence of physical 
strength in determining the guilt or innocence of a citizen through regulated court procedures 
aimed at getting the truth of the matter as opposed to a fighting match between the defendant and 
the accuser. In a wrestling match, however, we think just the opposite. The point is that 
substance is brought into any procedure, and only an incoherent procedure would lack substance. 
Of course, Estlund’s point stands: any desirable procedure must bring in substance, and show 
that it is uncontroversial. But we have learned an additional important point: a procedure need 
only be uncontroversial in the particular context that it is used. In relation to majoritarianism, 
additional support is provided to the view that the principle need not be uncontroversial in all 
circumstances as Dworkin suggested in the lifeboat example, but only in the particular context of 
legislation. 
 
C. A Simple Matter of How Much Disagreement 
 
 If Waldron were to concede that majoritarianism is thinly substantive, must he accept that 
majoritarianism immediately is subject to reasonable disagreement?73 Recall that the original 
requirement for legitimacy of a political institution is justification to all reasonable citizens. It 
was at this point that Waldron made the distinction between substantive and procedural fairness, 
with the former being always subject to reasonable disagreement. This distinction was helpful in 
defending against more robust substantive solutions, such as Dworkin’s solution. However, 
placing reasonable disagreement into a simple dichotomy allowed Estlund to corner Waldron’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Christiano, “Debate: Estlund on Democratic Authority,” 231. 
72 Christiano, “Debate: Estlund on Democratic Authority,” 232. 
73 At times, Waldron appears to concede majoritarianism is controversial, such that he allows its inclusion 
within the purview of reasonable disagreement.73 As he puts it, “[i]t looks as though it is disagreement all 
the way down.”73 His subsidiary argument relies instead on pragmatic considerations for the adoption of 
majoritarianism. 
 In a situation where there is disagreement as to which political procedure to endorse in making 
important political decisions, citizens must first decide on a temporary procedure to use in order to decide 
on a more permanent one. Waldron suggests, in this case, that majoritarianism is preferable on pragmatic 
grounds, because (1) it is “an ordinary and familiar procedure,” and (2) “we need a procedure on this 
occasion.”73 In considering this argument, more sense can be made – in his newest formulation of the 
argument – of his use of the assumption of an existing democratic institution as a fundamental premise.73 
With such an assumption, a majority-decision would likely constitute “an ordinary and familiar 
procedure,”73 above and beyond any other candidates for a decision-procedure in the aforementioned 
situation. 
 This argument does not give the robust consensus that we are looking for in a legitimate decision-
procedure. For this reason, I will be attempting to defend majoritarianism as uncontroversial. 
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majoritarianism. As we have learned, the distinction between substantive and procedural fairness 
is a false dichotomy, because a coherent fair procedure necessarily includes a thin substance in 
its exclusion of irrelevant factors. 
 Closer examination of Waldron’s majoritarian principle in the proper context of politics 
provides several uncontroversial, substantive reasons for its adoption. Recall that Estlund defined 
the principle to defend as “giving each person the greatest possible chance of being decisive 
compatible with everyone’s having an equal chance.”74 Two substantive claims must then be 
defended: (1) that citizens are the appropriate source from which to derive opinions or 
preferences and (2) the appeal to citizens’ opinions or preferences should be equal. In a sense, 
what follows is mostly a reiteration of Waldron’s previous points. However, given the strength of 
Estlund’s objection, I think it appropriate to highlight exactly what supports Waldron’s 
substantive claims. 
With regard to the first point, each citizen’s opinions or preferences are considered for 
two independent reasons, one negative and the other positive. Negatively, in the ordering of a 
legitimate political institution, it is unclear where opinions might derive from if not from the 
citizens. That we should, e.g., adhere to a coin-toss is itself an opinion that must come from some 
source. Note that we’ve already set aside what Estlund identifies as the purely procedural option 
as incoherent. In fact, I cannot think of any coherent political system that does not include the 
opinions of at least some citizens – whether it be one, many, or all. I suppose that a group of 
people could decide to follow a god of sorts, but upon whose word is this idea introduced? I have 
belabored this point because of the emptied concept of procedure introduced by Estlund, in light 
of the requirement of full anonymity. It seems clear that the opinions of at least some citizens 
will always be relevant.  
A positive reason to consider each citizen’s opinion or preferences is our consensus that 
all have rights, which assumes that citizens are capable and responsible thinkers on important 
political issues that affect others. This results in a degree of trust or faith that we should listen to 
other citizens, while setting aside appeals to whether or not they are right. Importantly, this 
positive reason is conditional on our agreement that citizens should have rights, but I think it is 
evident that we have consensus on this substantive view. In this way, majoritarianism is 
interested in an outcome favorable to the maintenance of citizens’ rights. For example, imagine a 
scenario where citizens are debating between two options, A and B, and all citizens support one 
or the other option. No citizen has knowledge of the other citizens’ views. They can either take a 
majority vote or consult a randomization machine. This randomization machine restricts the 
outcomes in a particular political decision to all of the possible options, which include A, B, C, 
and D.75 Though it is uncertain which options will result in better or worse outcomes, the view 
that all have rights requires the consistent belief that the citizens have reasonable views about the 
options – including C and D – and their effect on other citizens in their ultimate support for A or 
B. To choose the randomization machine would then be an act of disrespect to the citizens as 
deliberators capable of reflecting on important political issues. It is in this manner that 
majoritarianism respects citizens as right-bearers in a way demanded by the trust that 
accompanies the attribution of rights. Recall that in the original defense of Waldron’s view, we 
characterized this feature as providing equal political status.   
Second, citizens are heard equally due to our impoverished epistemic state of equality, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Estlund, “Jeremy Waldron on Law and Disagreement,” 120. 
75 Note that this randomization machine is not of the purely procedural sort, but more akin to a coherent 
type of randomization machine discussed in the previous section. 
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which provides no reason to favor one reasonable citizen over another. Dworkin may believe the 
best institution is a constitutional democracy. Another may believe that it is a coin-toss, or even a 
randomization machine. However, because we cannot know which view is better or worse due to 
widespread disagreement as part of the circumstances of politics, we cannot privilege those that 
favor a coin-toss over those that favor a randomization machine. From this impoverished 
epistemic state, we can derive a thin commitment to equal decisiveness, but not anything more 
robust. In fact, this state of equality is – to a degree – regretful. Consider how desirable it would 
be to have even limited answers to the great questions of rights. But majoritarianism alleviates 
the concern that an outcome might favor one individual’s views over another. Again, this feature 
can be seen in the original defense of Waldron’s view of equal political impact.  
In arguing for a modified version of Waldron’s approach, I have not fully ignored his 
original argument. Instead – setting aside the additional negative justification – it becomes clear 
that Waldron has already provided a substantive justification. The distinction between purely 
procedural and substantive justifications only became helpful, because majoritarianism calls for 
what we ordinarily think of in terms of simple procedures. As Stephen Macedo notes, “majority 
rule is merely a voting rule.”76 In fact, it is this intuitive appeal of majoritarianism as a simple 
procedure that makes Waldron’s view so appealing.  
More robust substantive views, such as Dworkin’s constitutional democracy, call for a 
much more complicated scheme that includes a set of predetermined issues entrenched in a 
constitution. Prima facie, it seemed quite different in kind to a simpler majority-rule type view. 
Estlund reminded us of the original standards of legitimacy that we sought out, and that was 
whether or not a view was controversial. In returning to this original understanding – and thus 
setting aside the procedure vs. substance distinction – a version of Waldron’s view appears to 
meet the standard for legitimacy. 
 Therefore, close examination of Waldron’s argument reveals a substantive justification 
for the endorsement of the majoritarian principle, but it is indeed very thin, and rests on 
uncontroversial propositions. Majoritarianism prevents further substance from getting in, except 
as it is put through the decision-procedure itself. That is, in an established majoritarian 
democracy, the input of substance requires a majority-consensus.   
 
Section VI: Judicial Review 
 
 As Dworkin aptly points out, “the [issue of the] validity of the majoritarian 
premise…is…at the heart of the long constitutional argument [about judicial review].”77 Judicial 
review may not be necessitated in a robust, outcome-based conception of democracy, but the 
strong case against judicial review prima facie hinges on the validity of majoritarianism. In 
response, a modified version of Waldron’s majoritarianism has been defended as a legitimate 
decision procedure. The worry is whether this thinly substantive version of Waldron’s 
majoritarianism undermines the argument against judicial review. To address this worry, I will 
first define exactly what is meant by judicial review and briefly describe how American-style 
judicial review exemplifies the type of institution that Waldron argues against. Then, I will 
analyze whether the thinly substantive version of majoritarianism is compatible with judicial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Macedo, “Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design,” 1038; The context of 
this quote is originally a criticism suggesting that a political system cannot be based on majoritarianism, 
which I address in “Section IV: Judicial Review.” 
77 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 18. 
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review. I will show that the modified version of majoritarianism is incompatible with judicial 
review when decisions are beyond the reach of the majority to reverse or alter its decisions. This 
conclusion is conditional upon the uncontroversial claim that all citizens have rights – though we 
may dispute what those rights are – and it is only by attacking this claim that Waldron’s 
arguments against judicial review may be undermined. 
 
A. What is Judicial Review? 
 
In “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” Waldron carefully defines the object 
of what is ordinarily contested in arguments for or against judicial review. The focus is on strong 
judicial review of “primary legislation enacted by the elected legislature of a polity.”78 It is a 
system where largely unaccountable “courts have the authority to decline to apply a statute in a 
particular case or to modify the effect of a statute to make its application conform with individual 
rights.”79 This contrasts with weaker forms of judicial review that lack the kind of authority in a 
system of strong judicial review. In a system of weak judicial review, “courts may scrutinize 
legislation for its conformity to individual rights but they may not decline to apply it,” i.e., a 
judge puts forth an opinion for the legislature to consider, if it has not already.80 
Further, the judicial review at issue is practiced a posteriori, i.e. after the legislative 
enactment of statutes rather than as part of the legislative process before their enactment. Finally, 
the focus is on rights-oriented judicial review of constitutionally entrenched rights, such as the 
Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution.81 Rights are entrenched where the majority may never 
alter or amend them. Waldron notes that “many of the challenges to rights-oriented judicial 
review can be posed to other forms of constitutional review as well.”82 For purposes of clarity, 
we will focus our case on rights-oriented strong judicial review. 
 
B. American-Style Judicial Review 
 
Though Waldron’s setup is designed to abstract the issue away from any particular 
system in an effort to make a more general and inclusive argument, the current judicial review 
performed in the U.S. Supreme Court is an obvious candidate system for what Waldron has in 
mind. For that reason, I will be adopting the U.S. Supreme Court in my analysis, and any 
reference to the U.S. Supreme Court and its functioning should be understood as a reference to 
the form of judicial review described above. Before reaching the question of the compatibility of 
judicial review with majoritarianism, I think it is helpful to understand how American-style 
judicial review is prototypical of the style of judicial review we are imagining, and so I’ve 
included a brief overview of American-style judicial review’s functioning. 
The highest court to hear cases in the U.S. is the Supreme Court.83 The most numerous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1354. 
79 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1354. 
80 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1355. 
81 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1358. 
82 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1358. 
83 I am setting aside issues of state courts, where the state’s own court of last resort is the final interpreter 
of their own state constitutions. However, arguments against the U.S. Supreme Court might be applicable 
to state court systems – with regard to its compatibility with state resident majorities – where their 
functioning resembles that of the Supreme Court. 
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set of the cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court consists in appealed lower court cases, where 
Justices choose from about eight thousand appealed cases every year, and make final decisions 
through written opinions for less than one hundred of them.84 In this manner, Justices have a 
great deal of discretion in choosing the issues they wish to address.85 Upon hearing a case that 
involves a legislative statute, they have the option of upholding the statute, striking it down in 
violation of the Constitution, altering the statute’s meaning, or relatedly finding it inapplicable. 
They are relatively unconstrained in this regard, because the three primary legal methodologies 
utilized – plain meaning, framer’s intent, and precedent – can often be used to argue either side 
of a case, and thus are unlikely to uniquely justify a particular decision.86 Justices thus can and 
do often utilize these methods in a way that conforms to their own preferences.87 
Justices are largely unaccountable to the people. They are “nominated and confirmed by 
elected officials,” but serve life terms.88 When the Court interprets a legislative statute contrary 
to its intended meaning, Congress can pass a new statute that clarifies its meaning – i.e. 
effectually overturning the Court’s ruling.89 Additionally, “Congress can hold judicial salaries 
constant, impeach justices, change the size of the Court, and make ‘exceptions’ to the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.”90 However, once a constitutional interpretation is affirmed in a decision, 
it is much more difficult to alter the effect. Congress or the states may pass a constitutional 
amendment, but this requires a supermajority.91 Non-compliance with a decision is possible and 
does occur, but we should question why the people should have to resort to this.92  
Considering these possible maneuvers to obviate decisions of the Court should appear 
troublesome in and of itself, because it suggests that we do not have any real control over the 
Court. Instead, we must resort to secondary measures to reverse or change decisions. In any case, 
the issue of the precise degree of unaccountability of the Justices is irrelevant for our analysis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Lee Epstein and Thomas Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Institutional Powers 
and Constraints, 12. 
85 Of course, they may be forced to address an issue, because of inconsistent lower court rulings. These 
cases often pertain to important political issues as well. Epstein and Walker, Constitutional Law for a 
Changing America: Institutional Powers and Constraints, 18. 
86 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and The Attitudinal Model Revisited, 111; As one 
example, they argue “legitimate precedents exist on both sides of controversies.”  
87 I am not here addressing the degree to which this is the case, but merely recognizing that it may occur. 
For a prominent book that discusses the influence of Justices’ preferences in decision-making, see Segal 
and Spaeth, The Supreme Court and The Attitudinal Model Revisited. 
88 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 1394. 
89 Epstein and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Institutional Powers and 
Constraints, 115. 
90 Epstein and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Institutional Powers and 
Constraints, 116. 
91 “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several 
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all 
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
several States or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may 
be proposed by the Congress;” U.S. Constitution Article 5. 
92 Larry Kramer suggests that non-compliance was the traditional solution to resist judicial supremacy 
through “political-legal” mechanisms, which made the public more aware of the people’s sentiments. 
Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 24-29. 
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For our purposes, all that matters is that the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution requires 
supermajorities to reverse through an amendment, and removal of a Justice from the Court 
ultimately requires the same.93  
 
C. Is Judicial Review Compatible with Majoritarianism? 
  
Waldron’s argument that judicial review is incompatible with majoritarianism focuses on 
the Supreme Court’s use of judicial review itself, but his focus is misplaced. It may be 
regrettable that the appointments of Justices are one-step removed from the people, but we can at 
least find it somewhat agreeable that it is our representatives that are doing the choosing – i.e. 
the President and the Senate.94 Under a majoritarian system, we of course retain the power to 
make the choice directly, if we found it more agreeable to our democratic sentiments. What is 
most troubling is that reversal of constitutional interpretations – and thus whether or not 
legislation is constitutional – requires a supermajority. 
First, it is important to make a distinction between the legitimacy of a government, and 
legitimacy of the decisions made by the government. As we have already discussed, the only 
legitimate government is one that is beyond reasonable disagreement. The legitimacy of the 
decisions made by the government depends on the legitimacy of the government itself. So long 
as the institution is beyond reasonable disagreement, then the decisions made within that 
institution are legitimate. In the case of a majoritarian democracy, it has already been shown that 
the institution itself is legitimate. Decisions made within that an institutional structure in which 
majority rule exerts ultimate control are thus legitimate as well. 
 In this distinction, the reasons for rejecting a system of strong judicial review become 
quite evident. There may be strong support for the institution of judicial review, and a 
supermajority may even reasonably support the institution. However, as part of our majoritarian 
form of government, strong judicial review is certainly not beyond reasonable disagreement. The 
people must retain the ability at all times – by majority vote – to decide the important political 
issues that are effectually taken out of their hands by the Court. 
 
D. Qualifying the Case Against Judicial Review 
 
 Recall that our modified version of majoritarianism is thinly substance, and so we must 
be careful to consider whether this alters or qualifies our case against judicial review. Also, recall 
that the modified version of majoritarianism endorses the uncontroversial assumption that all are 
entitled to basic rights, and that when combined with the permanent circumstances of politics, 
this assumption necessitates a fundamental right to participate.  
Sharing the view that all citizens retain the “right of rights,” John Hart Ely, in Democracy 
and Distrust, argues for a form of American-style judicial review that he concludes respects 
citizens’ right to participate, and thus would be compatible with our form of majoritarianism. 
Much like Waldron, Ely makes a distinction between procedure – embodied in political 
participation of citizens – and substance – embodied in outcome-related values. Legitimate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments…And no Person shall be convicted 
without the Concurrence of two thirds of the members present. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall 
not extend further than to removal from Office.” U.S. Constitution Article 1 Section 2. 
94 “[The President] shall nominate, and, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint…Judges of the supreme Court” U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 2. 
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judicial review, he argues, is concerned with the former in a “representation-reinforcing 
approach,” in contrast to the latter, which presumes that “judges are better reflectors of 
conventional values.”95 In other words, it is not an affront to citizens as reasoners capable of 
reflecting on important political issues when judges are acting to clear “the channels of political 
change” that promote participation by citizens.96 Unelected judges, as “comparative outsiders in 
our governmental system,” are uniquely suited to “objectively…assess” whether political 
procedures are being properly followed.97 
 Two responses should tell against Ely’s representation-reinforcing view of judicial 
review. First, as the analysis of Waldron’s view has already demonstrated, the distinction 
between procedure and substance is a false dichotomy. Unlike Waldron’s dichotomy however, 
Ely includes a much more robust substance in his conception of procedure. Instead of requiring 
that the majority be decisive in matters of procedure, Ely’s procedural view elevates the 
judgment of a few – i.e. the unelected judges – over all citizens in determining whether the 
majority takes the minority’s interests into account. Similar to Dworkin’s robust substantive 
view, the decision to elevate the judgment of some over all is a similarly controversial view, and 
thus illegitimate as a non-majoritarian institution. Second – and in relation to the first point – 
there is no uncontroversial justification in supposing “the moral capacities respected in the idea 
of rights are only capacities to think substantively, as opposed to capacities to think reflectively 
about procedures.”98 Instead, respect requires the belief that citizens’ moral capacities extend to 
all matters of disagreement, including Ely’s characterization of political procedure. 
 Additionally, we must also recognize that allowing substance into majoritarianism 
qualifies our case. As previously mentioned, the modified version of majoritarianism endorses 
the assumption that all are entitled to basic rights, and that when combined with the permanent 
circumstances of politics, this assumption necessitates a fundamental right to participate. If this 
is not the case, then our majoritarian argument fails, and the case against judicial review falls 
through. I take it that this is an uncontroversial claim, and so only thinly substantive. Thus, the 
modified version of majoritarianism undermines Waldron’s original argument against judicial 
review only insofar as the aforementioned crucial assumption does not hold. 
 Having argued that majoritarianism is incompatible with American-style judicial review, 
we must recognize that forms of weak judicial review are still possible. For example, the 
majority may delegate judicial representatives on their behalf to perform judicial review, just as 
we do with congressional representatives. In this sense, there would be no incompatibility if the 
Supreme Court were composed of majority-elected members that served limited terms and could 
be recalled upon a majority vote. Any desire for greater insulation from the people conveys only 
distrust, and much greater problems will arise in a community formed on such a bond.  
 Stephen Macedo points out that “majority rule is merely a voting rule, employed in 
particular settings,” and cannot be the basis of a whole political system.99 He is partially correct 
in this assertion. It is a voting rule, but this should be viewed as a benefit to the construction of a 
political system. Where there is widespread disagreement about important political issues, it 
provides a neutral framework to address these issues – in contrast to any non-majoritarian 
institution that will, for example, entrench certain rights that require a supermajority to change. 	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For this reason, majoritarian democracies will look different from one country to another. The 
people may decide to have a directly elected court that engages in judicial review, or they may 
have judges appointed by a president that do not have the ability to strike down legislation. Many 
different systems can be imagined. Most important, however, is that in all of these systems, the 
majority retains the ultimate power to change whatever they see fit. All the different 
arrangements of the political system would initially be set up by a majority decision, and it is by 
this same method that they may be altered or removed. The people then are able to take a more 
active role in setting up their government. It is a much more malleable system in this regard. 
 The immediate worry would be the stability of a system that is always subject to change, 
as opposed to more firmly established non-majoritarian systems. But two considerations speak 
against giving that worry too much weight. First, it is not clear why there should be an 
established political system where the majority of us feels there is a need for change. For 
example, a contemporary society might feel that a five hundred person legislature is antiquated 
due to the exponential growth of their population, and so double the size of the legislature. If the 
size began to be viewed as harmful to meaningful deliberation, the majority could contract the 
legislature. Second, that it is our immediate concern that a political system be stable can be 
reflected in our careful deliberation on the matter. If we are concerned with stability, it is likely 




We started out with an abstracted version of Waldron’s circumstances of politics, which 
framed the problem of politics as how to achieve coordinated action in the midst of large-scale 
disagreement. The remedy was to find a procedure that is beyond reasonable disagreement of 
citizens in order to obligate them to the outcomes of the procedure, whatever they happen to be.  
In response, two plausible solutions were presented, Waldron’s procedural solution and 
Dworkin’s substantive solution. It was demonstrated that Dworkin’s robust substance lacked any 
independent criteria by which to measure, and in fact relied on a false consensus embodied in 
existing constitutions. Waldron’s majoritarianism, free of robust substance, lacked Dworkin’s 
substantive problem, and was defended against objections that majoritarianism lacks substantive 
equalities. 
After endorsing Waldron’s procedural solution, majoritarianism was tested against the 
original requirement that a legitimate procedure is beyond reasonable disagreement. It was first 
established that, though subject to reasonable disagreement in specific contexts, majoritarianism 
is uncontroversial as a general principle. However, Estlund presented a forceful argument that 
revealed undefended substance in Waldron’s majoritarian solution. In accepting the existence of 
substance in any coherent fair procedure, the procedure vs. substance distinction was set aside as 
only helpful in distinguishing Waldron’s view from much more robust substantive views such as 
Dworkin’s constitutional democracy.  
Closer analysis revealed that Waldron’s majoritarianism, though thinly substantive, was 
indeed defensible more or less on Waldron’s own terms. The essential, substantive premise that 
majoritarianism rests on is the view that all are deserving of rights, which carries with it a trust of 
others as careful deliberators, and thus the proper sources of opinions about important political 
issues. Those that fear a “tyranny of the majority” might question their willingness to attribute 
rights as belonging to all. However, if we acknowledge the widespread disagreement about 
important political issues, illegitimate rule or despotism is the only alternative to majoritarian 
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democracy.  
After establishing the legitimacy of majoritarian democracy, the question of the 
compatibility of judicial review with majoritarianism then became a simple question of whether 
or not the use of judicial review is subject to majoritarian scrutiny. So long as any particular 
instance of judicial review can be reversed or altered by the majority, then it is compatible. If 
not, then it is not compatible. In the instance of American-style judicial review, which is the 
prototypical example used by Waldron and others, the requirement of supermajorities to reverse 
decisions by amendment is beyond the majority’s control, and thus incompatible with 
majoritarianism. 
Given the injection of substance into our modified version of Waldron’s majoritarianism, 
the case against strong judicial review requires qualification. It was shown that Ely’s attempt to 
defend strong judicial review within democracy was too robustly substantive, because it required 
the controversial belief that the opinion of unelected judges in matters of procedure is 
substantively better than the people themselves. Most importantly, our case against strong 
judicial review is conditional upon the belief that it is beyond reasonable disagreement that all 
citizens are entitled to the enjoyment of basic rights, whatever those rights happen to be. 
 
  
  
 
 
